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Rorty condivide con Derrida la visione del fenomeno linguistico come una dinamica di 
relazioni che manca di un “centro” interpretativo. Egli ha inoltre in comune con l’autore 
Francese una concezione dell’esperienza per la quale viene rigettato il concetto 
classico di referenza: il nostro uso del “linguaggio” e la nostra percezione di ciò che 
chiamiamo “fatti bruti” funzionano come e coincidono con equivalenti sistemi di forze, 
giochi i cui elementi esistono per il loro riferirsi a certe convenzioni. Tuttavia, un 
fondamentale quanto sottile disaccordo sorge circa la questione se considerare o 
meno tale posizione stessa come una sorta di trascendentalismo.  Da qui, la necessità 
di analizzare come il neo-pragmatismo Rortyano, sottraendosi dal riconoscere una sua 
propria inevitabile preferenza interpretativa verso un certo tipo di linguaggio, si sviluppa 
in una contraddizione e un paradosso. Lo stesso paradosso per il quale, 
paradossalmente, Rorty aveva criticato il quasi-trascendentalismo di Derrida. 
  
     69 Rorty shares the view of the linguistic phenomenon with Derrida as a dynamics of 
relations which lacks an interpretative “centre”. He also has a conception of experience 
in common with the French author whereby the classical concept of reference is 
dismissed: our use of “language” and our perception of what we call “brute facts” 
function as and coincide with equivalent systems of forces, games whose elements 
exist because they refer to some conventions. Nevertheless, a disagreement as 
fundamental as it is slight arises on the question of whether to consider this position 
itself as a sort of transcendentalism or not. Hence, the necessity to analyze how the 
Rortyan neo-pragmatism, in avoiding an acknowledgement of its own inevitable 
interpretative preference towards a certain type of language, develops into a 
contradiction and a paradox. The same paradox for which, paradoxically, Rorty had 
criticized Derrida’s quasi-transcendentalism. 
 
 
Rorty partage avec Derrida l’opinion d’un phénomène linguistique comme dynamique 
de relations qui manque d’un “centre” d’interprétation. Il partage aussi avec l’auteur 
français une conception de l’expérience selon laquelle la conception classique de 
référence est rejeté: l’utilisation que nous faisons du “langage” et la perception que 
nous avons de ce que nous appelons “faites bruts” fonctionnent comme et coïncident 
avec un système de forces, des jeux dont les éléments existent parce qu’ils se réfèrent 
à des conventions définies. Cependant, un essentiel aussi bien que léger désaccord se 
produit sur la question si considérer ou non cette position comme une sorte de 
transcendantalisme. D’où la nécessité d’analyser comment le néo-pragmatisme de 
 
 Rorty, évitant de reconnaitre sa propre inévitable préférence interprétative pour un 
certain type de langage, il se développe dans une contradiction et un paradoxe. Le 
même paradoxe pour lequel,  paradoxalement, il avait critiqué le quasi-






It is meaningful how the comment by Richard Rorty on the «problem 
about fictional discourse» in the Speech Acts theory1 seems to recall, at least 
formally, the argumentative pattern of the criticisms made by Jacques Derrida 
- in his analysis of Austin’s How to do things with words2 - about the 
interpretation of “non-serious” and “citational” utterances as language 
exceptions. In order to examine such resemblance, we intend to underline 
three points in particular. 
   
In the first instance it is appropriate to show how the objection of 
Derrida to the notion of «citation - (on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) - » 
interpreted as an anomaly of language3 is based on considerations of what 
the conditions of success of an utterance are in general. Those 
considerations, taking into account the equivalent parasitic structure of 
citation and iteration of any performative utterance4, would suggest that 
maybe a difference of ‘status’ between an ordinary discourse and an 
“abnormal” one is not given - with specific ethical consequences. 
  70 
Within a similar argumentative model Rorty – while contesting the 
way in which Searle ‘rearranges’ the so called «axiom of existence» in his 
analysis of fictional and ‘real world’ talks5 - remarks how, while uttering any 
illocutionary act “in which a definite description is present”, «one can 
successfully refer to something if one can conduct a coherent conversation 
about it»6. This seems to be, for Rorty, the only criterion and condition of 
success of a description and, therefore, both «references which entail that 
what is referred to ‘exists’»7 and references to fictional characters and object 
can be – or, more precisely, should be - studied not by wondering «how 
words relate to the world»8, not by assessing the status of their “reality”, but 
by just considering them as equivalent linguistic games created for different 
purposes. 
What is plain, so far, is the character of sheer convention which both 
authors read as coincident with the existence of any linguistic meaning. And 
in both cases it is basically the feature of relationality and the rejection of any 
character of intrinsicality of a meaning which the functioning of a conventional 
game implies. 
 
 Both Rorty and Derrida employ a telling lexicon to display that 
feature: while the former talks about language «in terms of use rather than 
meaning», as «just a form of life in a Wittgensteinian sense»9 and about 
words as «being counters used in games of assertion and denial, where any 
game can be played as long as there are conventions to tell one what moves 
to make»10 the latter, to depict the same condition of working, the same 
“essence” of the existence of an institution like language, formulates 
rhetorical questions like «could a performative utterance succeed […] if it 
were not identifiable as conforming with a an iterable model, if it were not 
identifiable in some way as a “citation?»11. 
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Austin, Derrida says, finally excludes the classical, 
representationalist concept of communication as “transport of a content of 
sense” in favor of a vision of language as «communicating a force through 
the impetus [impulsion] of a mark»12. In fact, as in Rorty’s quote of the notion 
of language-games, for which words are not something representing an 
external reality but forces and tools which constitute and transform reality by 
a relation with other tools13, what Derrida notes is the necessity to dismiss 
the classical sense of “reference”: «the performative does not have its 
referent outside of itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself. It does 
not describe something that exists outside of language and prior to it. It 
produces or transforms a situation, it effects»14. But although he 
acknowledges this merit in Austin, Derrida asserts that the theory of 
performative missed recognizing what the conditions of functioning of such 
system of citations leads to. A relations of forces as iterable – self-de-
contextualizing - marks, in fact, brings about the impossibility of talking about 
a pure transmission of an ‘original’ intention of the speaker. Given the 
citational nature of all language, in fact, any iteration of an expression in a 
different context is subject to an inevitable loss of the talker’s “ordinary”, 
original sense - as a cit 15ation made by an actor on a stage . 
We could say that in their papers both Rorty and Derrida are 
interested in denouncing an illegitimate “difference of status” which is 
hypothesized in formulations of the Speech Acts Theory: a difference 
between a more real and original level of language and a derived one. That 
presupposition would manifest itself in Searle through his fundamental 
realism - «Searle has defended all along a basic realism, resting not just on 
respect for the facts of how the world is and how it works, but also on a view 
to the effect that realism and the correspondence theory of truth are essential 
presuppositions of any sane philosophy»16 - and in Austin through his urging 
on the consideration of an «ordinary language» while excluding an 
«abnormal one»17. The structure of the linguistic phenomenon that Rorty and 
Derrida try to illustrate -its being a system of elements or, more exactly, 
 
 forces which act in equivalent games of relations 18 – would allow us to 
refuse such distinctions of level. Nevertheless, despite what we could call, 
apparently, a surprising affinity, it is really by looking into an issue like the 
possibility of arguing about an essence, a fundamental structure of the 
linguistic phenomenon that we can find the most acute and key disagreement 
between the position of the two authors. 
   
We need to consider, in fact, how Derrida goes so far as to denote 
the notion with which he identifies the inevitable dynamics of relations, the 
differences and references to something else which forms any meaning – the 
différance - as a «quasi-transcendental»19 ‘concept’ - namely, a kind of 
“concept” that transcends any single signifier and meaning but that is implied 
by all determinations of meaning, whilst Richard Rorty «believes that the 
attempt to determine a supposed essence – or, we can say, origin - of 
language would be something which really makes no sense»20 and cannot 
help but interpret it simply as a danger to a philosophy of pure “pragmatic 
conversation”21. In fact, he writes that «the fact that language is a play of 
differences, as well as an instrument useful in acquiring knowledge, gives us 
no reason to think that words like différance and trace can do to, or for, 
philosophy what Heidegger failed to accomplish with his own magic words — 
Sein, Ereignis, and so forth»22.Our main aim will be, therefore, to try to 
understand the deep reasons of that apparent contradiction. For to 
concentrate ourselves on the root of that disagreement, once we have 
recognized a significant familiarity of purpose in some of the most analytical 
texts of Rorty and Derrida, may lead us to state whether and how a 
conciliation is possible - and if it would be really philosophically relevant or 
only an adjustment of some linguistic misunderstanding. And such an attempt 
of conciliation would involve an important question: is it possible that what 
Rorty, in the wake of Quine, disapproves of as being a «foundationalist 
attempt to derive our theories – our way of assessing reality - from a more 
basic source of knowledge, i.e. from ‘privileged representations’»23 could be 





                                       II 
 
Rorty’s criticism of an approach which desires to search the 
essential and fundamental way in which we are “linked” to the world holds a 
double importance. That tendency is contemplated both, as a historical 
concern, as a peculiar feature of the “tradition” from which the American 
philosopher claims to be an heir and, as a theoretical concern, while clarifying 
 
 the reason for which to base a theory on the idea of an essence of language 
is, for Rorty, useless and distracting. He equates several authors – like 
Husserl and Russel - in the attempt to achieve the same Kantian goal, «to 
give sense to the idea of “theory of knowledge” as a specifically philosophical 
discipline»25. When «Russel discovered “logical form” and Husserl 
discovered the “purely formal” aspect of the world which remained when the 
non-formal had been “bracketed”»26 they both express the need to outline a 
«distinction between what is “given” and what is “added by the mind”, or 
between the “contingent” (because influenced by what is given) and the 
“necessary” (because entirely “within” the mind and under its control)»27. 
Once this distinction between something which is intrinsic in the 
structure/essence of our ideas/language and what is an empirical and 
‘external’ data is accepted the aim of any philosophy becomes to state what 
is the most correct, the most rational and the least deceiving picture of reality 
– and, therefore, the most suitable behavior to face it – which we can 
achieve. 
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In particular, we find the way in which Rorty evaluates the utility and 
the convenience of what he called the linguistic turn28 to be very interesting. 
In one of his articles in which he is absorbed in dealing with different 
interpretations of the two main works of Wittgenstein, Rorty draws the 
reader’s attention to the difference which exists between his position and the 
position of those whom he calls “Wittgensteinian therapists” – like Thomas 
Rickett and Warren Goldfarb29. These latter «take seriously the suggestion of 
Wittgenstein that what philosophers do “is to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use”»30 For them «the importance of the 
linguistic turn lies in helping us to realize that philosophers have failed to give 
meaning to the words they utter»31. They seem to accept, in substance, the 
proposition of Ayer for which «analytic philosophy was concerned only with 
clarifying the underlying logic of language, and on the other hand, 
metaphysics, which was to be exposed as nonsense, and hence eliminated» 
32. Consequently, «the therapists take the last pages of the Tractatus very 
seriously indeed»33. 
Those who are called “Wittgensteinians therapists” by Rorty agree 
with Wittgenstein that any problems we find ourselves dealing with, 
substantially, derive from some misinterpretation of our form of language. 
When we do not target the ordinary usage, the “correct” use of our words we 
ineluctably end up employing a metaphysical, inept, empty language. The 
therapists in fact, Rorty goes on to say, «do their best to tie them [the last 
pages of the Tractatus] in with the metaphilosophical portions of 
Philosophical Investigations»34. Some of them, in fact, associate many 
passages of the Tractatus and of the Philosophical Investigations in their 
 
 proposing an alternative view of what we should intend for “nonsense 
sentences”, in contrast with Frege or Carnap. Wittgenstein, in James 
Conant’s opinion, would not believe that «there were such things as 
“syntactical rules.”»35 In effect, «when Wittgenstein is confronted with an 
utterance that has no clearly discernible place in a language game, he does 
not assume that he can parse the utterance; rather, he invites the speaker to 
explain how she is using her words, to connect them with other elements of 
the language-game in a way that displays their meaningfulness […]. When 
Wittgenstein criticizes an utterance as nonsensical, he aims to expose, not a 
defect in the words themselves, but a confusion in the speaker’s relation to 
her words – a confusion that is manifested in the speaker’s failure to specify 
a meaning for them»36. Rorty also declares that he has been convinced by 
Conant and Witherspoon that even the Tractatus itself was written by its 
author in order to get its sense not by “understanding its sentences”, but 
rather by understanding “the author” himself, «and the kind of activity in 
which he is engaged»37. 
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The American philosopher agrees with this latter reading of 
Wittgenstein - which shows how, into the bargain, the Wittgensteinian holism 
for which «to know what inscriptions and sounds mean is just to know about 
the various ways in which they are used in relation to other inscriptions and 
sounds»38 has a lot to share with a Derridian conception of syntax and 
meaning39. 
But – Rorty seems to maintain a little later – it is really a partial and 
weak interpretation of Wittgenstein’s operation by the “therapists” that makes 
his philosophical interests and the interests of the latter to diverge. It would 
indeed be the notion of sense seen as the result of the understanding of a 
kind of activity – of certain type of game – which would bring us to leave any 
effort of “elucidation” in the sense of clarification of the form of language we 
use. That notion would show us how to try to «explode illusions of sense from 
within» and to «find a way of altering one’s inner state»40 - so as to fix any 
misunderstanding of one’s use of language, as the “therapists” intend – 
would be an attitude which would hold little philosophical interest or, even, a 
deceptive attitude. The motivation is easy to grasp. In fact, when the 
“therapists” point out even only the concept of what would be an “illusion” of 
sense, they are just missing the most significant ‘ethical’ outcome which can 
be drawn from a view which analyses language as getting its meanings from 
several different typologies of ‘games’. 
Let us see what Rorty considers this to be. Soon after distancing 
himself from the project of the therapists he reminds us that, once one 
accepts the refuse of what we call an essential ‘syntax’ of language, there 
would be no sense to «draw a clear line between the cognitively meaningful 
 
 and the cognitively meaningless»41. Basically, what Rorty does is to create a 
discourse which concerns the danger and the fear of the possibility of unfairly 
discriminating certain kinds of language-games, of conversations whose 
sense cannot be irrelevant, given the differences between various contexts 
and historical periods. If we have to read the theory of Wittgenstein while 
forgetting any “Carnapian” attitude, we have necessarily to assert that «when 
we are unable to read off intentional properties from physical inscriptions and 
sounds, this is only because we are unable to place the inscriptions and 
sounds within a wider context»42.  
Rorty makes us conscious of the always present threat of taking into 
consideration values and criteria of significance of a certain context-situated 
theory/language-game while judging them by means of the criteria drawn 
from our context of pragmatic needs, histories and values. For it would really 
be our context or our type of conversation that would determine the building 
of any of our theories about the essence and the structure of language. 
Therefore, it would be partial and unjust to assess the quantity or the quality 
of sense of a language-game by submitting it to schemes of a peculiar vision 
of the nature, the purpose or the functioning of language, because the latter 
would reflect only what would be the specific needs of a specific pragmatic 
situation-conversation. Such an attitude would provoke a tendency to make 
(arbitrary) adjustments of certain kinds of ‘questions’ with the intent of getting 
a presumed ‘greater order’ and a smaller ‘confusion’.      75 
This threat proves itself to be real even within the text of 
Wittgenstein himself. Rorty holds in fact that the holistic notion of language as 
an activity «regulated and formed by different rules depending on different 
‘forms of life’»43 formulates, on one hand, arguments «that anticipate, 
complement, and reinforce Quine’s and Davidson’s criticisms of the 
language–fact distinction» - as we said, one of the distinctions which traces 
the Kantian attempt to draw an exact theory of knowledge. On the other 
hand, it is evident how such a conception of language – which carries with it 
the necessity and the desire of making it well distinguished from any 
traditional or ‘metaphysical’ conception and activity – leads Wittgenstein to 
establish a clear division between what would be the “everyday use of words” 
- «what philosophers are out of touch with»44 - and the “misuse of language”, 
that we undoubtedly need to reform.45. 
It is interesting to grasp that in Rorty’s illustration of the 
consequences of the philosophy of Wittgenstein we can identify a ‘double’ 
function which is ascribed to Wittgenstein’s thesis, not necessarily 
attributable to the author’s ‘intention’. 
This is the first ‘role’ of this thesis: simply to make us aware of the 
inevitability of seeing language as “social practice”. To make us conscious of 
 
 the inevitability of the holistic view which thinks «of our uses of words, and of 
our beliefs, as just worldly objects in constant casual interaction with other 
worldly objects»46 which, therefore, draw their sense just from this 
interaction. This function is the ability, already recalled, to anticipate the 
arguments of Quine and Sellars for the «social and conversational 
justification of belief», of meaning, which therefore does not need the 
highlighting of some special kinds of «relations between ideas or between 
words and obje 47cts» in order to be justified . 
The second side of the intellectual function of Wittgenstein’s thesis 
seems to be, however, to make us see it as acting like a sort of ‘pragmatic 
device’, like a certain strategy aimed to help a thinker – a human – placed in 
our philosophical and cultural context to choose his behavior or language-
game according to its utility. A device, in any case, which really because of its 
proper theoretical sense and structure would not demand, paradoxically, to 
hold a greater ontological value than other schemes of behavior and 
language-games arisen in other cultural periods. 
   
This is perhaps the main reason of the distance which marks the 
position of Rorty from Wittgenstein and the therapists. Rorty’s first reaction to 
the interpretation made by the therapists – namely, their application of the 
discovery of a certain sense and structure of language for the purpose of 
cleaning linguistic confusions - is in fact, as we have hinted, to establish that 
a use of the notion of language as “activity practice” which is oriented to 
«explode illusions of sense» would be only a matter of «self-transformation», 
of «altering one’s inner state»48. It would be again, in other words, an 
application of a certain “transcendental” point of view which would have the 
‘narrowed’ effect of just changing someone’s conception of what is 
meaningful. Nevertheless, the pragmatist’s goal is the ‘broader’ and more 
important attempt of «creating a better human future»49. And in order to do 
that, a conception of language cannot prefer and cannot recommend any 
peculiar sense of language, structure or language-game except by taking into 
account its “utility” – and not its ‘intelligibility’ – within a certain context50. 
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With these words, and by showing the circularity of this latter 
sentence, we are trying to extrapolate from the text of Rorty what would be, 
pragmatically, a recourse to a ‘transcendental’ approach. Given the 
equivalent ontological dignity and “relativity” of any conception of language as 
linguistic game – Rorty shares Quine’s conviction whereby any theory and 
universe of discourse can be interpreted only as ‘parasitic’ of another 
universe of discourse51 - how can we discern a situation or a context where it 
is operating a philosophical attitude, a philosophical interpretation of the 
world which assumes a «notion of philosophy of language as first 
philosophy» and «a notion of philosophy as having foundations»52 from a 
 
 situation where we can identify a pragmatic interpretation of reality? Are we 
not, in any case, up against some total interpretations of the world which are, 
to use Rorty’s lexicon, equivalent «voices in the conversation of mankind»53, 
equivalent constructions of relations and references to other «networks of 
terms and predicates»54, constructions «which center on one topic rather 
than another at some given time not by dialectical necessity but as result of 
various things happening elsewhere in the conversation[…]»55? How can we 
distinguish between a need in mankind of a certain kind of conversation 
which would be coincident with a “transcendental” attitude and a need which 
is not or is less involved in it? Is it not consequential to the fact that a certain 
kind of conversation assumes “one topic rather than another at some given 
time as result of various things happening” that any typology of discourse 
coincides with a “privilege of certain types of ‘representations’” rather than 
others? And that that typology of discourse tends to assess reality by means 
of “criteria” which are just those kinds of ‘representations’, that is of 
meanings? 
   
Rorty agrees that a pragmatic difference between a “foundationalist” 
thought and a discourse which prefers a mere ‘conversation’ cannot be made 
in terms of different quality of sense, clarity or meaning. As we said by 
recalling a certain «second side of the intellectual function of Wittgenstein’s 
thesis», for Rorty any typology of language is in that sense intrinsically 
equivalent: «[…] The language game in question is one that Heidegger 
deliberately and self-consciously created. It is utterly implausible to think that 
Heidegger might have been led, by a process of elucidation, to find himself 
“confused about his relation to his own words.” Like Descartes, Locke, Kant, 
Newton, and Einstein, he gave a technical sense to familiar terms, and 
invented neologisms, hoping thereby to expand our linguistic repertoire in 
ways that would bear fruit»56. 
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Once no essential answer can be given to the question “what is 
philosophy?”57 or, at most, once its function is read as that of being a mere 
«cultural genre»58, the consequential equivalence of “pragmatic sense”59 – in 
the sense of any language-game owning an equivalent dignity of sense as 
being just the expression of pragmatic questions - which we have to confer 
on any interpretation of the world leads us to assert that, in the text of Rorty, 
the difference we are debating about can be clarified only by examining the 
justification which is given by the author for any intellectual and practical 
choice. 
This justification is, obviously, the one concerning the mere utility of 
a type of thought: taking into account only this factor would make a decision 
to be based on ‘conversational’ and ‘pragmatic’ criteria and not on what he 
calls “privileged representations”. In the end, «the characteristic idea of 
 
 philosophical pragmatism is that ideas and practices should be judged in 
terms of their usefulness, workability, and practicality and that these are the 
criteria of their truth, rightness and value»60. We have seen that, eventually, 
what Wittgenstein can suggest to “pragmatic Wittgenstenians” is that one can 
only «distinguish more useful from less fruitful ways of speaking, and thus 
better scientific or philosophical theories from worse theories»61. It seems to 
be the pure act of judging only by the usefulness that would convert any 
theory – from being a ‘transcendental’ position - into a mere pragmatic 
“conversation of mankind”. 
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Yet, we find here a last tangle which needs to be unravelled. We 
need to ask ourselves about the possibility that such a judging act itself, and 
its products, would depend on and be conditioned by a previous 
“transcendental” point of view which Rorty cannot help but assume. In other 
words, it is necessary to investigate the ‘operative’ relation and the inevitable 
interference between the two sides of the function of the “thesis” about what 
we should mean with “language”, which we have drawn from Rorty’s dialogue 
with the Wittgensteinian heritage. Namely between the consideration of any 
‘point of view’/language-game as an equivalent sense construction and social 
practice (since each of them gets its sense and practical use from a different 
context) and, on the other hand, the “more basic” ‘point of view’ about 
language seen as an holistic construction of tools and objects equivalent to 
other objects and as social practice. 
Can we perceive, inside the texts of Rorty and his concrete ethical 
proposals, the fear that the previous, general intellectual consideration of that 
‘basic’ point of view has already altered, confined and influenced in some 
way the range of available choices of language-games which the author 
decides to further as suitable for our historical and political context? 
 
 
                                     III 
 
In order to find out how much the sense of Rorty’s conception of 
language and of the “quasi-transcendentalism” of Derrida’s différance at the 
Origin resemble one another, although the American philosopher distanced 
himself from the latter so manifestly, we should be interested in 
understanding whether the danger Rorty felt in considering philosophical 
positions like Derrida’s could be also located, by assuming paradoxically the 
sight of Rorty himself, inside a simple pragmatist behavior, despite all 
‘intentions’ of the America philosopher.  
 
 In order to evaluate the concrete potential usefulness which is 
inherent to the ethical outcome of a pragmatist’s works, we should ask 
ourselves whether there can be a boundary between: 
1-what we can consider an elucidation of what our use of language 
in the end is, so that we can allegedly base our behavior just on the ‘utility’ of 
our language-games and not on other external criteria, and 
2- what we can consider a “clarification of the form of language”, 
which would coincide with an a priori - “unfair” - privilege of certain kinds of 
syntax or - as a pragmatist would surely prefer – certain areas of language-
games in spite of others. 
For we cannot deny, in first place, that Rorty’s pragmatist route led 
him to explicitly privilege a particular “area” of language-games present in our 
historical-political context, specifically the ‘area’ he incarnates in the figure of 
the liberal ironist62. 
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He coherently defines the ironist as one who considers her 
arguments and her vocabulary as different descriptions or re-description of 
the world aimed toward practical goals, rather than the fruit of a research 
toward some fundamental logic of our language and reality. An ironist «hopes 
that by the time she has finished using old words in new senses, not to 
mention introducing brand-new words, people will no longer ask questions 
phrased in the old words. So the ironist thinks of logic as ancillary to dialectic, 
whereas the metaphysician thinks of dialectic as a species of rhetoric, which 
in turn is a shoddy substitute for logic»63. The «culture of liberalism» is also 
declared as «one which was enlightened, secular, through and through. It 
would be one in which no trace of divinity remained, either in the form of a 
divinized world or a divinized self»64. Our intention is obviously not to open a 
political debate, but rather to notice how a rate of potential harms – due to the 
privilege given to certain philosophical ‘attitudes’ and ‘language-games’ - is 
present, in an equivalent way – “structurally” - , in a ‘mere pragmatist’ 
position. 
For this purpose, can we by any chance explicitly show or 
demonstrate, by quoting examples of current and recent events and studies, 
that «liberal societies of our century»65 have caused or have been causing 
specific harm, “unsuitable” situations between people, unfair political 
decisions, imbalanced rapports between groups of persons, or economical 
shortages? This would be a too heavy an aim for this work. We can, though, 
by proposing a different interpretation of the concrete attitudes Rorty talks 
about, make a consideration about their working and their structure. 
We can notice first of all that, on a practical level, what Rorty 
opposes to a «divinized world or a divinized self» is a world in which men, 
instead of acting with the purpose of achieving some ‘general values’, act 
 
 while they «are able to recognize the contingency of the vocabulary in which 
they state their highest hope»66. This clear distinction seems to be the 
concrete upshot of the contrast between positions which claim to 
demonstrate the existence of a fundamental structure and of «statements 
capable of being justified to all those who are uncorrupted»67 and positions 
which are not obsessed by “metaphysical needs”68. A man who is member of 
a liberal society should not act and, therefore, have beliefs, because he is 
persuaded of their Truth and «absolute validity»69, but rather, pragmatically, 
he should «be content to call “true” whatever the upshot of the worldly 
encounters turns out to be»70. 
   
The intrinsic dynamics of formation and the ‘nature’ of the results of 
such “encounters” reveal themselves to be, using the lexicon of the texts we 
have surveyed so far, the dynamics of an encounter between «an ‘old’ and a 
‘new’ vocabulary»71. And by taking into account «language as a historical 
contingency»72 - and historical contingency as changing languages, we could 
add – we are free from the traditional tendency of considering any 
transformation or ‘evolution’ of values as a kind of dialectic or stream of 
meanings guided by a ‘rational’ explanation, intention or sense. As Rorty 
points out, no criterion is able to warrant any general, ‘philosophical’ or 
ethical justification for a decision, given the total – ‘empirical’ – contingency of 
the encounters between language-games. It becomes impossible to state 
whether a mutation of vocabulary is a reasonable persuasion or a forced 
cultural imposition73. There is no method for deciding between these two 
alternatives – any individual could be able to decide, and be ‘justified’ in 
deciding, in the former or the latter sense. 
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In order to describe the general feature which a (liberal) community 
and its individuals should own, Rorty says, «if we accept the opposition 
between reason and passion, or reason and will, we liberals will be begging 
the question against ourselves. It behooves those of us who agree with Freud 
and Berlin that we should not split persons up into reason and passion to 
drop, or at least to restrict the use of, the traditional distinction between 
"rational conviction" and "conviction brought about by causes rather than 
reasons»74. The restriction Rorty talks about is the device of considering 
“rationality”, what is “reasonable” and warranted, only as typical and unique 
of one certain language-game/vocabulary: «the best way of restricting its use 
is to limit the opposition between rational and irrational forms of persuasion to 
the interior of a language game, rather than to try to apply it to interesting and 
important shifts in linguistic behavior»75. 
The criterion of “reasonability” simply gets its sense inside a certain 
circumscribed vocabulary: the same term or concept, in effect, can assume a 
different weight and assessment inside different contexts and language-
 
 games and, above all, in no way can we discover a general method or 
scheme which would be capable of describing, predicting, or creating a 
general sharing of sense between the various contexts, simply because that 
would suppose the existence of a «standpoint outside the particular 
historically conditioned and temporary vocabulary we are presently using»76. 
Any supposition of a method of this sort could not help but recall what Rorty 
would denote as a “metaphysical” force, a force which would own the 
capacity of “balancing”, of “making harmonized” values of various contexts 
from some “outside standpoint”. 
The ideal pragmatist figure seems to be drawn by the author with 
the purpose of respecting – by definition - and being aware of all the above-
mentioned theoretical premises. To sum up, the citizens of his liberal utopia 
«would be people who had a sense of the contingency of their language of 
moral deliberation, and thus of their consciences, and thus of their 
community. They would be liberal ironists»77. And what the contingency of 
his time persuaded Rorty to assess as the “pragmatically best” system to live 
in is Western liberalism: «He grants a special privilege to the Western liberal 
democratic community - this privilege is what he refers to as 'liberal 
ethnocentrism'. If liberals acknowledge that they can only work by their own 
lights, Rorty believes that it follows that they should recognize that liberal 
democracy is the best possible form of government»78. 
  For a “pragmatist” all this preference is based only on an 
«evaluations of facts»79. And, apparently, such an “evaluation of facts” gets 
its legitimacy and its authority from the assertion of certain structures of the 
formation, transformation and validity of our meanings and values. The 
awareness and statement of such fundamental dynamics and structure - the 
empirical and contingent relation of different language-games which 
constitute different contexts - is the basic argument from which we can 
visualize the necessity of assessing the suitability of a style of culture only by 
the efficacy we are able to identity in it, in its current and contingent events. 
Nevertheless, as we noticed, the “pragmatist” rejects any commitment which 
could dimly resemble a type of “transcendental” attitude: «I want to illustrate 
the difference between taking a standard philosophical problem (or cluster of 
interrelated problems such as free will, selfhood, agency, and responsibility) 
and asking, on the one hand, "What is its essence? To what ineffable depths, 
what limit of language, does it lead us? What does it show us about being 
human?" and asking, on the other hand, "What sort of people would see 
these problems? What vocabulary, what image of man, would produce such 
problems? Why, insofar as we are gripped by these problems, do we see 
them as deep rather than as reductiones ad absurdum of a vocabulary? What 
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 does the persistence of such problems show us about being twentieth-
century Europeans?"»80. 
Rorty considers his analysis, which we have called “structural”, as a 
kind of “becoming conscious” of the inevitability of dropping any theorization 
of essences in favor of more “local” questions which would help to assess the 
utility of contingent facts and situations. And yet we have to notice that this 
would-be “local” assessment can only originate from and can only be 
underpinned by a general point of view, a general interpretation of the world 
or, to better say, a general idea of language-game. Whatever range Rorty 
confers to his analysis of language, “transcendental” or not, this analysis 
turns out to coincide with an indication toward a general attitude/scheme of 
behavior, the “one” which sums up, “includes” all different contexts in which 
one operates and carries oneself ‘as when’ he considers any communication 
«to require no more than agreement to use the same tools to pursue shared 
needs»81. 
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This attitude/language-game, which Rorty’s position proposes, has 
necessarily to be described “in general”. It cannot go into depth and specify a 
clear content in its pragmatic questions, answers and practical rules. We 
could say that a pragmatist’s position has “by definition” to be formulated in 
general: for it is intrinsic in such a position that «any criterion of 
“reasonability” of an assertion simply gets its sense inside a certain 
circumscribed vocabulary: the same term or concept can assume a different 
weight and assessment inside different contexts». 
The absence of a dominant theoretical explanation, which could 
conduct us to schematize the way in which a human considers a choice 
‘reasonable’, makes it impossible to formulate in advance the content of the 
questions a pragmatist typically asks himself: «what sort of people would see 
these problems? What vocabulary, what image of man, would produce such 
problems? Why, insofar as we are gripped by these problems, do we see 
them as deep rather than as reductiones ad absurdum of a vocabulary? 
Etc..». To prematurely formulate to whom exactly that “we” refers to, to 
specify in what sense we are “gripped” by some problems and what exactly 
these problems are, would mean to outline the figure of the liberal individual 
by the feature of just a peculiar vocabulary. Much less could we give those 
questions their answers in advance. 
We cannot help but notice a paradox in the intentions of Rorty. Such 
intentions are basically to criticize the search of an essence of language, an 
order and a logic which could be recognized throughout our experience so 
that we are able to arrange a “general theory”. For this “general theory” would 
not be capable of taking into account all nuances, all necessities, all 
intentions which form all various and single contexts taking place “beneath” 
 
 the application of a general order. Such “application” would provoke suitable 
and unsuitable consequences, according to the peculiar single situation it is 
going to deal with. For instance, «those who speak the old language and 
have no wish to change, those who regard it as a hallmark of rationality or 
morality to speak just that language, will regard as altogether irrational the 
appeal of the new metaphors – the new language game which the radicals, 
the youth, or the avant-garde are playing. The popularity of the new ways of 
speaking will be viewed as a matter of "fashion" or "the need to rebel" or 
"decadence.»82. A general, ideal schematization of the functions of language 
cannot necessarily fit the specific and ‘existential’ needs of any individual 
context or event which it claims to include. 
But, in order to do that, Rorty has to put the individual of the liberal 
community in a sort of ideal position, where she can put some ideal 
pragmatic questions from within the general and ideal disposition which 
claims that «there is no pragmatic difference, no difference that makes a 
difference, between "it works because it's true" and "it's true because it 
works"»83. 
To recall a question we had placed earlier, it could be the case that 
it is not possible to draw a boundary between «what we can consider an 
elucidation of what our use of language in the end is, so that we can allegedly 
base our behavior just on the ‘utility’ of our language-games» and «what we 
can consider a “clarification of the form of language” which would coincide 
with an a priori - “unfair” - privilege of certain kinds of syntax or language-
games in spite of others». 
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For what we cannot help but wonder, in fact, is if Rorty, in his 
proposition of an interpretation of the world/language game, has considered a 
structural risk inherent in any proposal of a general typology of society, 
behavior, culture or language-game. That is, the risk of really seeing our very 
“ideal intentions” lost and misunderstood within the innumerable and 
indefinite individual contexts across which it is “spread”. In other words, the 
risk inherent in the fact that a pragmatic and liberal attitude and situation 
does not exist except within and as coincident with different individual 
contexts, orders, idealizations, logics, or language-games each carrying their 
own inevitably “privileged representations” with them. 
This is a fact which would make any “intention” impossible not to be 
altered and transformed in something else each time “it” and its “effects” are 
at work within a different individual context/vocabulary. When we talk about 
“intentions” we mean everything can be summed up under terms such as 
meanings, values, beliefs, needs, wishes, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ intentions (here 
intended in a ‘moral’ account) for which one does something: any little shade 
of elements which can ultimately determine the communal utility of a context. 
 
 What Rorty needs to suppose on the sly, we believe, when he furthers a 
figure for whom «true sentences are not true because they correspond to 
reality, and so there is no need to worry about what "makes" it true»84 is a 
kind of “ideal intention” which could be applied to any individual changing 
context, a ‘good intention’ which is in any case able to decide on the most 
useful choice for the total context, the intention of the ideal pragmatist. The 
big risk, in this case, is to place oneself in the presumed safer area, or even 
‘ground’, of a general, ideal, or ‘higher’ attitude: the area of the “non-
representationalist but pragmatist’s questions”, thanks to which one can 
definitely get nearer a greater ‘suitability’ of the total situation. 
   
The possibility of such ‘greater fairness’ in recommending a certain 
kind of ideal figure, culture and (non)structure of language and knowledge, 
would depend on the possibility of assuming an ideal and good intention 
which would avoid its otherwise ineluctable alteration – or, more precisely, its 
being “originally altered”. This alteration would divert any choice towards 
being an expression of peculiar judgments, meanings, ‘bad/good intentions’ 
and needs at any time; it would make any choice be an expression of a 
particular single reason/context85. Really the same failure which we noted 
can equivalently occur when we assume a general theory of reality/language 
- like that of Wittgenstein, Kant, Searle – to represent the essential structure 
of reality. That is the danger because of which, in the end, we agree with the 
skepticism of Rorty toward Wittgenstein’s notion of “everyday use of 
language” – as opposed to a “confused” and “metaphysical” one – and 
toward Searle’s speech acts rules for their success and their ‘relation to the 
world’. There we can perceive the danger of putting ourselves, by means of a 
philosophical and theoretical justification, on a safer, “fairer ground”, a 
privileged area of attitude without taking into account that its alleged ‘reason’ 
and ideal scheme-of-reality would concretely coincide, in its worldly 
applications and “impositions”, with innumerable little «encounters between 
language-games» which can give rise to useful, ‘more suitable’ individual 
contexts as well as ‘less suitable’ ones - «no criterion is able to warrant any 
general, ‘philosophical’, ethical justification for a decision[…] there is no 
method to decide between these two alternatives [persuasion or a forced 
cultural imposition], any individual could be able to decide, and be ‘justified’ in 




                                      IV 
 
What we recalled about the inevitable dispersion and alteration of 
what we summarized with the term «intentions» is, in effect, a reference 
 
 toward the criticism made by Derrida toward the speech acts theory of Austin 
and Searle. We could now ideally come back to the start of the present paper 
by saying that it is meaningful that such danger coming from a sort of 
“transcendental” attitude, such as that which we have just described, is 
densely discussed in the work by Derrida (Limited Inc.) which we recalled 
then. 
We noticed that “surprising affinity” between the condition of 
success of formation of sense of a sentence stated by Rorty and Derrida: 
both of them suggest the necessity for a meaning of being an element which 
gets its value in a conventional and relational way – for any scientific, 
aesthetic or ethical feature exists only as relational in a changing 
environment86. These two characters indicate the impossibility of “drawing 
out” from experience any general and “more rational” scheme to assess 
reality independently from single contexts. We now just want to shed a light 
on how the text by Derrida, while talking about such character of relationality, 
proves itself to be in a sense more extreme than what the proposal and the 
intentions of Rorty seem to concede. 
In the central pages of Limited Inc. and in its afterword, the relational 
character of the sense of utterance is discussed by Derrida to specify the 
danger which would result from the theory of Searle - the danger of assuming 
a certain ideal ‘reason’ and bunch of rules to assess the effectiveness of 
language. In fact, for Derrida to assume that «[would mean] tantamount to 
state, in a normative or prescriptive manner, that towards which language 
ought to tend»87 and to «reproduce, under the guise of describing it in its 
ideal purity, the given ethical conditions of a given ethics»88. 
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To prevent such danger in the best way possible, we should become 
aware of the dynamics of dispersion and iteration – coincident with the 
character of relationality in changing contexts - which forms the meaning of 
an intention and which allows this latter to be “effective” in a community. 
Such dynamics makes it impossible - for the sense which is ‘carried’ by the 
intention - to spread over linear and coherent contexts-vocabularies. The 
‘force’ of an original intention, just in the act of being uttered, is already 
transformed in something else by the different events-contexts within which it 
is working: «would a performative utterance be possible if a citational 
doubling [doublure] did not come to split and dissociate from itself the pure 
singularity of the event?»89. 
This impossibility to rest on a ‘safer’, linear and privileged “area of 
language” in which «encounters between language-games» do not continue 
to create different suitable and unsuitable events-contexts is the 
consequence of the relational structure of any meaning. As Derrida writes, 
«[the] essential absence of intending the actuality of utterance, this structural 
 
 unconsciousness, if you like, prohibits any saturation of the context»90. From 
that we can go on to state that any general rule for the success of 
performative is unnecessary and unsuitable. 
Elsewhere Derrida called dissemination91 the nature of the sense as 
relentlessly changing in single events-contexts and «hyperbolite 
généralisée»92 his habit to radically reject the possibility to lie on the integrity 
– we can say ‘on the existence’ - of a theory and of a concept if only it shows 
the risk of losing its – if ever owned - original sense in different innumerable 
single events. 
We noticed that perhaps Rorty missed calculating that risk. We now 
allow ourselves to interpret such shortcoming as a consequence of the lack 
of an essentially more radical and structural attitude in analyzing the nature of 
language and language-games, even more once considered that the 
conclusion of Derrida, even if argued through a different lexicon, seemed to 
be implicit in the texts of Rorty, as we saw. 
   
Rorty tried to prevent the same danger Derrida perceived by reading 
the theory of Austin and Searle, but his fear of the possibility to «draw a clear 
– and unfair - line between the cognitively meaningful and the cognitively 
meaningless»93 manifested itself in him in the reasoned refusal to confer any 
type of direction, method or seriousness to philosophy – including Derrida’s 
criticism of logocentrism - which might coincide with a preference of a ‘local’ 
language-game and privileged area of sense, privileged local kinds of 
‘philosophical’ needs, wishes, tensions or struggles94. 
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But, paradoxically, that refusal was only illusory, as we saw. For the 
structural risk to cause harm and ‘misunderstandings’ which one can 
diagnose within the various encounters between local reasons which form 
any application of a typical pragmatist’s questions and liberal behavior 
unveils that Rorty’s escape from privileging a certain structure of the world 
and a certain language-game ends up being itself a privilege of a certain 
structure and ‘point of view’. A certain structure of language and ‘area of 
sense’ which, once privileged, cannot help generating the same structural 
potential of risk as any privileged particular structure and “reason of the 
world” 95 does. 
What is more, we can now quote Derrida and say that «that risk is 
an internal and positive condition of possibility»96: the condition of the 
construction of any language, discussion or ‘language-game’. It is because of 
that that we ultimately find it is equivalent to maintain that Rorty inevitably fell 
in a “transcendental” attitude by trying to avoid it himself – signaling, 
therefore, a conception of language as an inevitable dialectic between 
transcendental attitudes – and to maintain that, in the end, Rorty always 
 
 needed a basic principle upon which to build his texts, but the dread of 
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